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This paper  derives the equilibrium timing of entries and exits as well as the 
equilibrium output levels over the industry life cycle. This paper also examines the effects 
of the increase in entry costs. It turns out that the first entry may occur earlier when the 
entry costs increase. In an extended model with 3 potential entrants, it is shown that the 
first entry may be delayed with the third firm, and that the less efficient firm may be the 





Competition among firms in growing industries has been one of the important issues in 
industrial organization. Gilbert and Harris (1984) and Mills (1988) showed that total profits 
from each additional investment (or production capacity) must be equal to zero because of 
the incentive to preempt the market in growing industries. These results are similar to the 
contestable market theory (Baumol, Panzar and Willig  (1982)) in that the monopolist 
receives zero profits not by the real competition, but by the potential competition. 
Firms may also compete to survive in a declining industry. Exit behavior of firms  in 
declining industries  is well explained by Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985, 1987). They 
showed that a smaller firm outlasts a bigger one in declining industries. Yoo (1990), on the 
other hand, showed that it is possible for a larger firm to outlast a smaller one by relaxing 
their assumption that the output level must be equal to the production capacity. 
Londregan (1990) put these two phases together, the phase of growth and the phase of 
decline. He explained the pattern of entries and exits over the industry life cycle, focusing on 
who preempts and who outlasts.  He  assumed, however, that production capacity is 
exogenously given and that all or nothing operation does exist. In his model, each firm 
decides only “in” or “out”. 
This paper assumes a situation similar to Londregan, a situation in which the industry 
evolves and subsequently devolves. Unlike Londregan, however, this paper assumes that 
reentry does not occur over the industry life cycle and that entry costs are the same for all 
firms. Instead, this paper endogenizes the choice on output levels (along with the choice on 
entries and exits). In this sense, this paper generalizes his model by relaxing his assumption 
that all or nothing operation does exist given the production capacity. By doing so, this paper 
examines what are the timing of entries and exits over the industry life cycle and what are the 
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equilibrium output levels at each instant? 
It is shown that the first entrant may have to enter the market when its net instant 
monopoly profit is still negative. Because of the incentive to preempt the market, the total 
profits during the monopoly period in a growing phase turns out to be close to zero when the 
cost difference is negligible. These results are similar to Gilbert and Harris (1984) and Mills 
(1990). In a declining phase, the less efficient firm exits as soon as its instant duopoly profit 
decreases to zero and the more efficient firm stays active until its instant monopoly profit 
decreases to zero. This pattern of exits is consistent with Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985, 
1987) and Yoo (1990). This paper also shows, in a two-firm model, that the early entrant (the 
late survivor) produces the monopoly output level of each instant  during the  monopoly 
period, and that each firm produces the Cournot output levels of each instant during the 
duopoly period. This result justifies the use of the monopoly output and the Cournot outputs 
over the industry life cycle where the market evolves and subsequently devolves.   
This paper examines also the following important questions: What are the effects of 
the increase in entry costs on entry? What are the effects of the third potential entrant on 
entry? It is shown that the first entrant may have to enter the market earlier when the entry 
costs increase.  It is also shown that the entry of the first entry may be delayed by the 
existence of the third potential entrant, and that the less efficient firm may be the first entrant 
in some exceptional cases. These results are interesting not only because they are new but 
also because they are contrary to our prior expectation. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section II describes the model in which two firms 
compete over the industry life cycle. Based on this model, Section III derives the subgame 
perfect equilibrium of the whole game. Section IV examines the effect of the change in entry 
cost on the timing of entries. Section V extends the model by allowing the third potential 
entrant. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.   
   
II. Model 
   
Consider a homogeneous market that evolves and subsequently devolves.  Two 
potential entrants compete in the market.  Let  ) (t
m
i p  and  ) (t
d
i p   be the profit-maximizing 
instant monopoly profit and the instant Cournot duopoly profit of firm  i  respectively. The 
term ‘instant’ denotes the stage game at time  t . 
Assume  that  ) (t
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i p  are twice continuously differentiable functions of 
time t. Assume further that  , 0 ) 0 ( < = t
m
i p   0 ) 0 ( < = t
d
i p  for  i  = 1, 2 ; there exists 
m
i Ta  
and 
d
i Ta (i =1,2) such that   
 
0 / ) ( > ¶ ¶ t t
m
i p   ) , 0 [
m
i T t a ˛ "  and  0 / ) ( < ¶ ¶ t t
m
i p   ) , ( ¥ ˛ "
m
i T t a  
 
0 / ) ( > ¶ ¶ t t
d
i p   ) , 0 [
d
i T t a ˛ "  and  0 / ) ( < ¶ ¶ t t
d
i p   ) , ( ¥ ˛ "
d
i T t a ; 
 
there also exists 
m
i Tb  and 
d
i Tb  (i =1,2) such that 
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These assumptions imply an industry l ife cycle: monopoly(or duopoly) profit  is 
negative at time 0; it increases until the peak time for the market demand; and then it 
decreases down to  negative levels again. The existence of 
m
i Tb  makes the game 
finite-horizon, eventually ruling out the existence of multiple equilibria usually found in 
infinite-horizon games. The equilibrium concept adopted in this paper is the subgame perfect 
equilibrium, and the series of the equilibrium of the stage game consist of the equilibrium of 
the whole game by the backward induction. For simplicity, this paper assumes large enough 
differences between 
m
i Ta  and 
m
i Tb   and between 
d
i Ta  and 
d
i Tb .  This assumption separates 
the entry and the exit phase. Assume further that firm 1 is more efficient than firm 2. That is, 
), ( ) ( 2 1 t t
m m p p >   ) ( ) ( 2 1 t t
d d p p >  for all  0 > t .   
The game is set in continuous time, but firms make decisions only at discrete time 
intervals, t =ꗄ, 2 ꗄ, 3 ꗄ, 4 ꗄ.... . Here, ꗄ is assumed to be close to zero (ꗄꇦ  0).  By 
doing so, I  avoid complications arising from the strategy space with uncountably many 
dimensions. In this sense, the equilibrium in this paper is the limit equilibrium of the limit 
game by Fudenberg and Levine (1986). 
Firms decide their output levels at each instant (that is, at each stage game). Firms 
exhibit Cournot behavior. There exists a unique Cournot equilibrium output level at each 
instant. Each firm enters the market by choosing  a positive output level and exits by 
choosing zero output level. A strategy,  i s  is a sequence of functions  it s  which maps from 
histories of the game onto the set of output levels [0, ꇄ).  Unlike Londregan (1990) and 
Gilbert and Harris (1984), firms are allowed to increase or decrease the output level at any 
instant.
1  For simplicity,  this paper assumes that the production capacity is flexible and 
costless. The operating costs of the firms are  ) , ( t Q Ci . There is no barriers to entry or exit, 
but there exists entry (or reentry) cost of  S e
rt -  for both firms discounted to time  0 = t .
2 
The game is under perfect and complete information, which implies that market demands as 
well as costs are common knowledge. 
 
Define   
 
1.  Gilbert and Harris  (1984) ignored the post-entry strategic reactions of the incumbent firm. In their 
model, the output level is not adjustable downward due to the assumption that the output level must be 
equal to the production capacity. Thus, the incumbent firm cannot reduce the output level below the 
existing capacity even after the entry of a new entrant and there is no strategic interaction in terms of 
the output level. The only choices open to the players are whether to increase the capacity at each 
instant of decision making and how much in such cases. 
2.  The assumption on the entry cost can be replaced with the assumption of exit cost without loss of 
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mi t  and  di t  denote the earliest instant at which the net instant monopoly and the net instant 
duopoly profit of the firm  i  become positive respectively. The term ‘net’  instant profit 
means the instant (monopoly or duopoly) profit minus the cost of entering the market one 
instant (  ꗄ) earlier. It is the ‘net’ instant profit, not the instant profit that is relevant in 
deciding whether to enter or not, since firms have to take into account the cost (opportunity 
cost) of entering the market one instant earlier. 
m
i t  a nd  ,
d
i t  on the other hand, denote the 
last instant at which the instant monopoly and the instant duopoly profits of the firm  i  
remain positive respectively. Since there is no exit cost, the term ‘net’ is not necessary here. 
Since the instant monopoly profit is always greater than the instant duopoly profits, 




i t t >  must hold for  i = 1, 2. It means that the earliest time at which the net 
instant monopoly profit (in a growing phase) becomes positive comes earlier than the earliest 
time at which the net instant duopoly profit becomes positive. It also means that the latest 
time at which the instant monopoly profit remains positive (in a declining phase) comes later 
than the latest time at which the instant duopoly profit remains positive. Figure 1 represents 
mi t ,  di t , 
m
i t   and 
d



















Figure 1  Profit Functions YOO: A THEORY OF INDUSTRY LIFE CYCLE 
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*
i t denotes the earliest time when firm i’s profits from entering the market as the first 
entrant are bigger than its profits from entering later at  i d t   as the second entrant. It is 
under the condition that the rival (firm j ) enters at time  j d t . It is the earliest time firm 
i would ever want to preempt the market if firm  j  enters the market at  j d t   as the 
second entrant. Later, it will be shown that the second entrant (let us say firm j) enters 
the market at  j d t  in the subgame perfect equilibrium.  Lemma III-1 is derived from 
the fact that firm 1 is more efficient than firm 2. The proof is straightforward and 
hence is omitted. 
 




1 t t < ,  2 1 m m t t < ,  , 2 1 d d t t <  
d d t t 2 1 > , 
m m t t 2 1 > . 
 
The following lemma shows that market preemption may occur before  the net 
instant monopoly profit becomes positive. 
 
Lemma  ꖲ-2: 
mi i t t <
*  for i =1, 2 if its rival (firm j) enters the market at  j d t . 
   
Proof:   
Firm i earns positive net instant monopoly profits at least during the period [ j d mi t t , ] if 
firm i enters the market as the first entrant and if the rival (firm j) enters the market at 
j d t  as the second entrant. Therefore,  mi i t t <
* .                         Q.E.D. 
 
In order to simplify the analysis, this paper makes two additional assumptions. 
First, total duopoly profits are enough to cover the entry cost when either firm enters 
the market at  i d t  as the second entrant  (i=1,2). Second, both firms are better off if 
they remain active in a growing phase once entered at 
*
i t  or after, instead of exiting 
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The following lemma is also helpful in deriving the equilibrium of the whole 
game. 
 
Lemma  ꖲ-3: 
The late entrant (let us say firm  j) must enter the market, in the subgame perfect 
equilibrium, at  j d t  at which the net instant duopoly profit becomes positive. 
   
Proof: 
The proof is rather straightforward. Since it is better for both firms to remain active in 
a growing phase, once entered at 
*
i t  or after, it is better for the early entrant (let us 
say firm i) not to exit in a growing phase. Thus, the late entrant (firm j) must enter the 
market at  j d t  at which the net instant duopoly profit becomes positive.     Q.E.D. 
   
Then, the subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game is summarized in the 
following proposition.   
   
Proposition  ꖲ-1: 
The subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game is: 




m t t t D - = ꇖ ) , min( 1
*
2 m t t  and produces the 
monopoly output level (of each instant) until  2 d t . 
2) Firm 2 enters the market and produces monopoly output level (of each instant) 
at any instant during  ] , [ 2
*
2 d t t  if firm 1 did not enter the market before that 
instant. Firm 2 enters the market at  2 d t  no matter what.   
3) Each firm  produces its Cournot output level  (of each  instant) during  the 
duopoly period, [
d
d t t 2 2, ]. 
4) Firm 2 exits at  D +
d t2 ꇖ . 2
d t  
5) Firm 1 produces the monopoly output level (of each instant) during ( ] , 1 2
m d t t  
and exits at  D +
m t1 ꇖ . 1
m t    
   
Proof: 
Let us first consider a declining phase. Derivation of the equilibrium timing of exits is 
similar to Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985, 1987) and Yoo (1990). Note that 
m
i t  is the 
instant when firm i has to exit even as a monopolist and 
d d t t 2 1 >  and 
m m t t 2 1 > . If both 
firms are active at 
m t2 , firm 1 does not exit and produces monopoly output level at the 
instant  D +
m t2 . It is because firm 2 has to exit at  D +
m t2   when its instant monopoly 
profit becomes negative regardless of firm 1’s decision. At time 
m t2 , firm 1 would stay 
in order to become a monopolist at  D +
m t2 . This means that firm 2 has to exit at time YOO: A THEORY OF INDUSTRY LIFE CYCLE 
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m t2 . With the backward induction,
3 one can easily show that firm 2 must exit in the 
subgame perfect equilibrium at time 
d t2 ,  that is, when firm 2 begins to receive 
negative instant duopoly profit.  Firm 1 would exit at  D +
m t1 , that is, when firm 1 
begins to receive negative instant monopoly profit. Again with the backward induction, 
firm 1 produces, in the subgame perfect equilibrium, the monopoly output level (of 
each instant) during the monopoly period. 
Second, let us consider a growing phase. As lemma III-3 shows, the late entrant, 
firm  j, must enter the market at  j d t , that is, when the net instant duopoly profit 
becomes positive. In the growing phase, however, both firms are expected to preempt 
the market as long as it is profitable to do so. Note that 
*
i t  is the earliest time firm i 










2 t  as the first entrant. Otherwise, firm 2 would enter the market at 
*
2 t  as the 
first entrant. Of course, this is only when  1
*
2 m t t £ . If 
*
2 1 t tm < , firm 1 would enter the 
market at  1 m t  any way since its net instant monopoly profit is already positive. In fact, 
*
2 t  is the latest time at which firm 1 must enter to become the first entrant. Therefore, 
the subgame perfect equilibrium strategy of firm 1  is to enter the market at 




m t t t D - = ꇖ ) , min( 1
*
2 m t t  and to produce the monopoly output level (of each 
instant) until  2 d t .  Firm 2 enters the market and produces monopoly output level (of 
each instant) during [ ,
*
2 t 2 d t ] if firm 1 did not enter the market before that instant.  
Firm 2 enters the market at  2 d t  no matter what, since its duopoly profit is positive.  
Again with the backward induction, each firm produces its Cournot output level  (of 
each instant) during the duopoly period, [ 2 d t , 
d t2 ] in the subgame perfect equilibrium. 
                                                           Q.E.D. 
 
The above proposition is consistent with Gilbert and Harris (1984) and Mills  
(1988). The existence of the potential entrant may cause the first entrant to enter early. 
The first entrant, firm 1 may have to enter the market when its net instant monopoly 
profit is still negative. Because of the incentive to preempt the market, the total profits 
during the monopoly period in a growing phase turn out to be close to zero when the 




2 t . Consumers are better off, on the other 
hand, with the early entry of the leader. The proposition 1 is also consistent with 
 





* t t t = ” ,  2 1 m m m t t t = ” ,  2 1 d d d t t t = ” , 
d d d t t t 2 1 = ” ,  and 
m m m t t t 2 1 = ” , there are three types of subgame perfect equilibria in exit phase of the game: First, firm 1 exits at 
d t  and firm 2 exits at 
m t ;  second, firm 2 exits at 
d t  and firm 1 exits at 
m t ;  third, fully-mixed strategy 
equilibrium in which both firms are indifferent between staying and exiting in every instant from 
d t  to 
m t . In 
this case, backward induction cannot be applied to derive the subgame perfect equilibrium of the whole game. 
But this case is ruled out by the assumption. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Ghemawat and Nalebuff (1985, 1987) and Yoo (1990). The less efficient firm exits as 
soon as its instant duopoly profit becomes negative in a declining phase while the 
more efficient firm stays active until its instant monopoly profit remains positive. 
The proposition 1 also shows that the early entrant (who is actually the late 
survivor) produces the monopoly output level (of each instant) during the monopoly 
period, and that each firm produces its Cournot output level (of each instant) during 
the duopoly period. It means that the monopoly output level and the Cournot output 
levels of each instant consist of the equilibrium strategy of the whole game over the 
industry life cycle. 
 
IV. Effects of the Change in Entry Costs on Entry 
 
The above  results are similar to Londregan (1990), except the fact the output 
level is endogenized. Because of its simplicity, however, the model in this paper can 
be used to answer many interesting questions. One example is  the effects of the 
increase in entry costs on the timing of entries. One may argue that the entry must be 
delayed with the increase in entry costs. It turns out, however, that the first entry may 
occur earlier even with the increase in entry costs. In other words, when entry costs 
increase, the total monopoly profits of the first entrant may increase because of the 
delay in the second entry. 
Before entry costs change, firm 1 (the first entrant) enters the market at 
*
2 t  and 
firm 2 (the second entrant) enters the market at  2 d t . 
*
2 t  is derived so as to make the 
area cde in Figure 2 equal to the area abc + the area efg. The area cde shows the gains 
from the preemption and  the  area  abc  and  the area  efg show the costs of the 
preemption. 
*


















Figure 2  Equilibrium Timing of Entries before the Change in Entry Costs YOO: A THEORY OF INDUSTRY LIFE CYCLE 
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When entry costs increase from  S e
rt -  to  S e
t r' - , the entry of the second entrant are 
delayed. Of course, it is firm 2 that enters as the second entrant in the subgame perfect 
equilibrium. The equilibrium timing of entry of firm 1, that is, 
*
2 t ’ is derived so as to make 
the area c’d’e’ in Figure 3 equal to the area a’b’c’ + the area e’f’g’. It can be easily shown 
that 
*
2 t ’ may be either bigger or smaller than 
*





















Figure 3    Equilibrium Timing of Entries after the Increase in Entry Costs 
 
The above result implies that the first entrant may enter the market earlier when 
entry costs increase. An intuitive explanation is as follows. When entry costs increase, 
first entrant may enjoy longer monopoly periods. It means that firm 1 has to enter the 
market earlier in order to preempt the market. In such cases, the direct effect of 
increase in entry costs (that is, the disincentive to enter the market early) is dominated 
by the indirect effect of increase in entry costs via extension of the monopoly period 
(that is, incentive to enter the market early). 
 
V. An Extension of the Model: The Case of 3 Potential Entrants 
 
What happens if there are three potential entrants competing in a  growing 
industry? Does the third firm cause the entry to occur earlier? Is the order of the entry 
unaffected by the third firm? 
Since the pattern of exits in a declining phase is quite similar to the case of two JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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potential entrants,
4 this section focuses on entry in a growing phase. As is in section 
III, let us assume, for simplicity, that firm 1 is the most efficient while firm 3 is the 
least. That is,  ) ( ) ( ) ( 3 2 1 t t t
m m m p p p > > ,  ) ( ) ( ) ( 3 2 1 t t t
d d d p p p > > ,  ) ( ) ( ) ( 3 2 1 t t t
t t t p p p > >  for 
all  0 > t . Here,  ) (t
t
i p  denotes the instant trigopoly profit of firm i at time t. Assume 
that there exists 
t
i t  such that   
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Here,  ) ( j t
s
i  denotes the earliest time when firm i’s profits from entering as the 
second entrant are bigger than its profits from entering later at  ti t  as the third entrant, 
given that one firm (let us say firm k) already entered the market. It is the earliest time 
firm i would ever want to enter the market as a second entrant (rather than entering the 
market at  ti t  as the last entrant), given the condition that the last entrant (let us say 
firm j)enters the market at  j t t . Again, one can easily show that the last entrant (let us 
say firm j), in the subgame perfect equilibrium, actually enters the market at  j t t , that 
is, when its net instant trigopoly profit becomes positive.
5   
This section makes the following assumptions. First, total trigopoly profits of 
the last entrant, whatever it may be, are enough to cover the entry cost when it enters 
the market when its net instant trigopoly profit becomes positive. Second, it is better 
for any firm (firm i, i=1,2,3) to remain active in a growing phase rather than to exit 
and reenter at  ti t  once entered at  ) (k t
s




4. In a declining phase, the subgame perfect equilibrium is characterized as follows. Firm 3 (the least efficient firm) 
exits first when its instant trigopoly profit becomes negative, firm 2 exits next when its instant duopoly profit 
becomes negative, and then firm 1(the most  efficient firm) exits last when its instant monopoly profit becomes 
negative. 
5. The proof is similar to Lemma III-4. YOO: A THEORY OF INDUSTRY LIFE CYCLE 
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Lemma V-1: 





i t j t < ) (   for i, j=1, 2, 3 and iꇁj 
 
Proof: Similar to those of lemma III-1, III-2. 
 
i) of lemma V -1 follows from the assumption that firm 1 is the most efficient 
while firm 3 is the least. ii) follows from the fact that firm i is able to earn positive net 
instant duopoly profits during the period [ di t ,  ti t ). 
 
Lemma V-2: 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( 3 2 1
s s s t t t < < ,  ) 3 ( ) 3 ( 2 1
s s t t <  and  ) 2 ( ) 2 ( 3 1
s s t t < . 
 
Proof: 
First, let us consider the subgame in which two firms (firm i and j) compete to be the 
second entrant after one firm (let us say firm k) already entered. The earliest time at 
which the more efficient firm (let us say firm i) would ever want to enter the market as 
the second entrant (rather than entering the market at  ti t  as the last entrant) comes 
earlier than the less efficient firm.




i <  for all i < j, under the 
condition that the last entrant enters the market when the instant trigopoly profit 
becomes positive. Second, the earliest time at which the more efficient firm (firm i) 
would want to enter the market as the second entrant comes earlier than that of the less 
efficient firm (firm j), when faced with the same firm (firm k). This is because the less 
efficient firm enters the market later as the  last entrant, and thus the second entrant 
can enjoy longer duopoly periods when his competitor is less efficient.
7 Therefore, 




i <   for all i < j and for all kꇁi, j.                           Q.E.D. 
 
Assume further that the profits of firm k are greater when its competitor is less 
efficient. Then, the earliest time at which firm k would want to enter the market as the 




k <  
for all i < j and for all kꇁi, j. 
Figure 4 shows it graphically by taking an example of  ) 2 ( 3
s t  and  ) 1 ( 3
s t .  ) 2 ( 3
s t  
makes area abe + area jkl equal to area eij and  ) 1 ( 3
s t  makes area cde + area ghl equal 
to area efg. 
 
6. For example,  ) 1 ( ) 2 ( 2 1 t t <  implies that the earliest time firm 1 would ever want to enter the market as a second 
entrant (rather than entering the market at  1 t t  as the last entrant) comes earlier than the firm 2 when firm s 1 and 
2 are competing to be the second entrant, because firm 1 is more efficient than firm 2. 
7. For example,  ) 3 ( ) 2 ( 1 1 t t <  implies that the less efficient his opponent is, the  earlier  firm 1 would ever want to 
enter the market as a second entrant (rather than entering the market at  1 t t  as the last entrant), because the less 
efficient f irm enters the market later as the last entrant. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 



















Figure 4   Profit Functions 
 
Lemma V-3: 
In the subgame where one firm, let us say firm k, already entered, firm i must enter the 
market at min( D - ) (i t
s
j ,  di t )ꇖmin( ) (i t
s
j ,  di t ) and firm j must enter the market at  tj t  
if firm i is the more efficient between the two (that is, if i < j). 
 
Proof: 
Lemma V -3 is similar to 1) of Proposition III-1. Let us assume that firm k already 
entered the market. Then, more efficient firm i is able to become the second winner 
(that is, the second entrant) if he enters the market at  D - ) (i t
s




i < . 
D - ) (i t
s
j   is the latest time at which less efficient firm j would never want to enter the 
market as the second entrant. Therefore, firm i has to enter the market at  D - ) (i t
s
j  to 
become the second entrant if  di
s
j t i t £ ) ( .  If  di
s
j t i t > ) ( , firm  i enters the market as 
soon as his duopoly profit becomes positive (at  di t ), since it is enough to be the 
second winner by doing so in that case.                              Q.E.D. 
 
Lemma V-4: 
Firm 3 cannot be the first entrant in the subgame perfect equilibrium. 
 
Proof: 
Let us assum e that firm 3 enters the market as the first entrant at t’ in a subgame 
perfect equilibrium. Then, the following conditions must be satisfied. First, firm 3 
must prefer entering at t’ as the first entrant to entering at  3 t t  as the last entrant. YOO: A THEORY OF INDUSTRY LIFE CYCLE 
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Second, firm 1 must enter the market at min( ) 1 ( 2
s t ,  1 d t ) as a second entrant and firm 2 
must enter the market at  2 t t  as the last entrant. Now, firm 2 knows that firm 1 would 
enter the market at min( ) 1 ( 3
s t ,  1 d t ) as a second entrant, and that firm 3 would enter the 
market at 
t t3 if firm 2 deviates and enter at t’-ꗄ. Then, firm 2 has an incentive to 
deviate and to enter the market at t’-ꗄ  as the first entrant. Note that i) the second 
entrant (firm 1) enters the market later when firm 2 deviates, since min( ) 1 ( 3
s t ,  1 d t ) is 
bigger or equal to min( ) 1 ( 2
s t ,  1 d t ), ii) the last entrant (firm 3) enters the market later 
when firm 2 deviates, since  3 t t  is bigger than  2 t t , and iii) the firm 2’s profit is bigger 
than that of firm 3. Therefore, firm 2 must prefer entering at t’-ꗄas the first entrant to 
entering at  2 t t  as the last entrant if firm 3 prefers entering at t’ as the first entrant to 
entering at  3 t t  as the last entrant. Since this is contradictory, firm 3 cannot be the first 
entrant in subgame perfect equilibrium.                               Q.E.D. 
 
Corollary V-1: 
Firm 3 must be the last entrant in the subgame perfect equilibrium. 
 
Proof: 
If firm 3 cannot be the first entrant, it must be the last entrant, since 
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 2 ( ) 3 ( 3 2 1 1
s s s s t t t t < < <  as shown in lemma V-2.                      Q.E.D. 
 
Now, let us investigate which firm (firms 1 or 2) enters first and when, in order 
to answer the following questions on the effect of the third potential entrant: 1) Does 
the entry of the first entrant occur earlier when there exists the third firm? 2) Is the 
order of the entry unaffected by the third firm? 
Since  2 1 d d t t <  and  ) 1 ( ) 2 ( 3 3
s s t t < , there are five possible cases: i) 
) 1 ( ) 2 ( 3 3 2 1
s s




d t t t t £ < £ , i ii)  2 3 3 1 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( d
s s
d t t t t < < £ , iv) 
2 3 1 3 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( d
s
d
s t t t t < £ < , v)  2 1 3 3 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( d d




i) If  ) 1 ( ) 2 ( 3 3 2 1
s s
d d t t t t < £ < , the existence of firm 3 does not affect the entry of firm 
1 and 2, 




d t t t t £ < £  or if  2 3 3 1 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( d
s s
d t t t t < < £ , the existence of firm 3 
makes firm 1 as well as firm 2 to enter  earlier (or at least at the same time) 
without the change in the order of entry,   
iii) If  2 3 1 3 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( d
s
d
s t t t t < £ <  or if  2 1 3 3 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( d d
s s t t t t < < < , the existence of firm 3 may 
delay the entry of firm 1. It may even change the order of entry in this case. 
 
Proof: 
Case i):  ) 1 ( ) 2 ( 3 3 2 1
s s
d d t t t t < £ <  JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
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Firm 1 enters at  1 d t  in the subgame when firm 2 already entered, and firm 2 
enters at  2 d t  in the subgame when firm 1 already entered. T hus, firm 1 enters the 
market at 
*
2 t   and firm 2 enters the market at  2 d t . Thus, the existence of firm 3 does 
not affect the entry of firms 1 and 2. 
 




d t t t t £ < £  or  2 3 3 1 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( d
s s
d t t t t < < £  
Firm 1 enters at  1 d t  in the subgame when firm 2 already entered, but firm 2 
enters at  ) )( 2 ( 2 3
d s t t <  in the subgame when firm 1 already entered. This means that 
firm 2 enters the market as  a second entrant before his duopoly profit becomes 
positive if firm 3 exists. This increases the incentive of firm 2 to be the first entrant 
and, thus, firm 1 must preempt the market earlier. 
Let us define 
* f
i t  to be the earliest time at which firm i would want to enter the 
market as the first entrant instead of entering as a second entrant. Then, 
*
1
f t  and 
*
2
f t  
can be represented as follows since  ) 2 ( 3 1
s
d t t < . 
   
} 0 ] ) ( [ ] ) ( [ inf{ 1
) 2 (
1





3 > - - - ” ￿ ￿
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Figure 5    Effects of the Existence of Firm 3 on the Entry of Firm 1 YOO: A THEORY OF INDUSTRY LIFE CYCLE 
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As shown in Section III, firm 1 enters the market at min( D -
*
2 t ,  1 m t ) as the first 
entrant when there are only two firms. 
*
2 t  is defined so as to make area cde + area 
ghk equal to area efg in Figure 5. When there are three firms, firm 1 enters the market 
at min( D -
*
2
f t ,  1 m t ) as the first entrant. 
*
2
f t  is defined so as to make area abe + area 
ghji equal to area efg. Since 
*
2
f t   < 
*
2 t ,  it that firm 1 enters the market earlier when 
there exists firm 3.
8 
 
Case iii):  2 3 1 3 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( d
s
d
s t t t t < £ <  or  2 1 3 3 ) 1 ( ) 2 ( d d
s s t t t t < < < , 
Firm 1 enters at td1 in the subgame when firm 2 already entered, but firm 2 
enters at  ) )( 2 ( 1 3 d
s t t <  in the subgame when firm 1 already entered. Firm 2 enters 
earlier than firm 1 as a second entrant. Faced with the same firm (firm 3), firm 2 has to 
enter the market earlier  than firm 1  as  a second entrant,  since firm 3 has more 
incentive to be the second entrant when competing with firm 2 rather than firm 1. 
Since firm 2 has to enter the market earlier as a second entrant than firm 1, firm 
2’s cost disadvantage is an advantage in the race for the first entrant as well. Thus, the 
order of entry is determined by the relative importance of disadvantage  in costs and 
advantage in entry timing as a second entrant. Note that the definitions of 
*
1
f t  and 
*
2
f t  
are changed as follows since  1 3 ) 2 ( d
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   (16) 
 
It turns out that the e ntry of firm 1  (as the first entrant) is delayed by the 
existence of firm 3 in this case. Since 
*
2
f t   is  the earliest time at which firm 2 would 
want to enter the market as the first entrant, firm 1 is able to become the first entrant if 
it enters at  D -
*
2
f t . Since 
*
2 t  < 
*
2
f t , the entry of firm 1 is delayed by the existence of 
firm 3 even if firm 1 is the first entrant. 
Furthermore, it is possible  for firm 2 to be the first entrant in the subgame 
perfect equilibrium in this case. Figure 6 shows an example. Assume i) the profits of 
firm 1 and 2 are very similar up to  1 d t  and then diverge after  1 d t , ii)  1 d t ꇖ 2 d t , iii) 
1 d t ꇂ ) 1 ( 3
s t , and iv)  ) 2 ( 3






f t , since 
*
2
f t  is defined so as to make area 
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abe equal to area eij and 
*
1
f t   is defined so as to make area cde + area ghj equal to area 
efg. The earliest time firm 2 would ever want to enter the market as the first entrant 
comes earlier than firm 1 and, thus, firm 2 enters the market as the first entrant at 
*
1
f t  
in the subgame perfect equilibrium. In this case, disadvantage in costs is negligible in 
the early stage of the game, while the advantage in the timing of entry as the second 
entrant is not. The disadvantage in costs is actually dominated by the advantage in the 























When an industry expands and subsequently shrinks, the timing of entries and 
exits as well as output levels are important issues not only for entrepreneurs but also 
for government policy makers. Entrepreneurs have to decide when to enter, when to 
exit and how much to produce while operating. Government policy makers should also 
be aware of the timing of entries and exits before they decide their policies. 
In this paper, I derived the equilibrium timing of entries and exits as well as the 
equilibrium output levels over the industry life cycle.  The first entrant may have to 
enter the market when its instant monopoly profit is still negative because of the 
incentive to preempt the market. In such circumstances, the total profits of the 
monopolist are reduced, but consumers are better off with the early introduction of 
goods or services.  Also,  each  firm produces the monopoly output level  (of each 
instant) during the monopoly period, and each firm produces its Cournot output level 
(of each  instant) during the duopoly  period. This result justifies the use of the 
monopoly output and the Cournot outputs over the industry life cycle. YOO: A THEORY OF INDUSTRY LIFE CYCLE 
  17 
This paper also examines the effects of the increase in entry costs on entry. 
Contrary to our prior expectation, it turns out that the entry of the first entrant may 
occur  earlier. It is because the first entrant may enjoy the longer monopoly periods 
since the entry of the second entrant is delayed by the increase in entry costs. Thus, 
the net effect of the increase in entry costs depends on the relative magnitude between 
the direct effect of the increase in entry costs and the indirect effect arising from the 
delay of the second entry. 
In an extended model with 3 potential entrants, it is shown that the entry of the 
first entrant may be delayed by the existence of the third potential entrant. It is 
because the second entrant enters the market sooner when faced with the competition 
from the third entrant, which, in turn, reduces the incentive to be the first entrant. In 
some exceptional cases, it is even possible that the less efficient firm may be the first 
entrant in the subgame perfect equilibrium. It occurs when the profit functions of the 
most efficient firm and the less efficient firm are very close up to a certain point and 
then diverge thereafter. In this case,  the  advantage in costs is dominated by t he 
disadvantage in the timing of entry as a second entrant, since the less efficient firm 
may have to enter the market earlier as the second entrant than the most efficient firm. JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
  18 
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